Phishing-resistant MFA for the Essential Eight

Facts read 18 Nov 2026

From Maturity Level Two the Essential Eight requires phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for users of online services and systems, and an option for customers. ASD names security keys, smart cards and passkeys. Biometrics can only be a secondary factor that releases something you have, and a single factor is not allowed for re-authentication. Read 18 Nov 2026 from ASD's maturity model, FAQ and assessment guide.

What does each maturity level require for MFA?

At Level One, multi-factor authentication is required for users of the organisation's online services that handle sensitive data, for third-party online services that handle sensitive data, and for customers of online customer services holding sensitive customer data. The factors must be something users have plus something they know, or something they have that is released by something they know or are.

At Level Two it also covers privileged and unprivileged users of systems, and the methods must be phishing-resistant for users of online services and systems, with customers offered a phishing-resistant option. Authentication events are centrally logged and protected, events and incidents are analysed and reported to the CISO and to ASD, and the incident response plan is enacted. At Level Three it extends to users of data repositories and applies phishing-resistant methods to customers of online customer services, not only as an option, with log analysis widened to non-internet-facing servers and workstations.

Which methods count as phishing-resistant?

ASD's assessment guide tells assessors to check for a security key, smart card or passkey. ASD's FAQ adds that passkeys qualify as multi-factor: a biometric or PIN releases cryptographic material tied to a device. It gives the same answer for Windows Hello for Business and Microsoft Authenticator, and says going passwordless is allowed, because those methods still use something the user has released by something they know or are.

The FAQ also states what does not count. Biometrics cannot be a primary factor; they can only release something you have. Microsoft's Trusted Signals cannot be a primary factor, though they can sit on top of two suitable factors. Security questions are not a valid memorised secret. Multi-factor authentication is required for re-authentication as well as authentication, so a single factor after the first login fails the control. ASD encourages solutions certified to the FIDO2 standard, preferably Level 2 over Level 1.

Can you start with passkeys at Level One?

Yes, and ASD suggests it. Its FAQ says an organisation aiming above Level One can implement individual higher-level requirements if that is cheaper in the long run. Its example is skipping physical one-time password tokens at Level One and going straight to smart cards, security keys or passkeys, instead of replacing the tokens a year later. ASD adds that organisations should not be penalised for implementing stronger measures than the level being assessed requires. Because the Level Two test observes both privileged and unprivileged users, a pilot group on security keys is not enough on its own to show the control across the boundary.

How does an assessor test phishing-resistant MFA?

For online services the assessor observes both unprivileged and privileged users signing in to the organisation's online services that handle sensitive data, and to third-party services handling sensitive or non-sensitive data, and checks that a phishing-resistant form is required. For systems the assessor watches a user log on to a workstation, and a privileged user log on to a server. For customers the assessor reads the security settings of a customer account and checks that a phishing-resistant option can be configured.

Logging is checked separately. On Windows the guide looks for the Audit Logon and Audit Special Logon policies set to success and failure, and checks the logs are stored centrally. For other implementations the assessor asks whether logging exists for every system users sign in to, and asks for evidence. A SIEM or equivalent protects logs from change or deletion.

What about customers who cannot use MFA?

ASD's FAQ accepts compensating controls for customers who cannot use multi-factor authentication because of personal circumstances, such as being in a vulnerable cohort. The goal is to avoid relying on a single factor for online customer services that hold sensitive personal data. ASD's example, subject to risk acceptance by an appropriate authority, is security questions in addition to a passphrase together with enhanced monitoring for signs of compromise. The wider rules are in exceptions and compensating controls.

What do platforms show for MFA evidence?

The multi-factor authentication coverage page lists the platforms. On 18 Nov 2026 Drata marks the strategy supported, with evidence examples that are manual, for instance identity provider policies enforcing MFA for administrators and remote access and a time-limited exception process. Vanta marks it partial, with no MFA-specific detail on its Essential Eight page. Scrut Automation has Entra and Okta pages describing MFA enforcement tests, not tied to the Essential Eight. 6clicks names MFA gaps for privileged accounts as a common Level Two gap. None found for a published test of phishing-resistant methods specifically, on any platform page read.

Frequently asked questions

Can I use passkeys for multi-factor authentication?

Yes. ASD's FAQ says passkeys use a biometric or PIN to release cryptographic material tied to a device, which meets the multi-factor definition. At Maturity Level Two, passkeys are one of the phishing-resistant methods an assessor looks for, with security keys and smart cards.

Can I use biometrics as a primary authentication factor?

No. ASD says biometrics can only be used as a secondary factor to release something you have, such as a device-bound key. A fingerprint or face match on its own is not a primary factor.

Sources

Last reviewed 18 Nov 2026